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| APPLICATION NO. | F | ILING DATE | FIRST NAMED INVENTOR | ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. | CONFIRMATION NO |
|--|--------|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 09/778,666 | | 02/06/2001 | Robert Allen Main | 017887005800 | 4361 |
| 20350 | 7590 | 12/16/2004 | | EXAM | INER |
| TOWNSEN | ID AND | TOWNSEND AN | CHAMPAGNE, DONALD | | |
| TWO EMBARCADERO CENTER EIGHTH FLOOR SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3834 | | | | ART UNIT | PAPER NUMBER |
| | | | | 3622 | - |

DATE MAILED: 12/16/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

| | Application No. | Applicant(s) | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | 09/778,666 | MAIN, ROBERT ALLEN | | | | | |
| Office Action Summary | Examiner | Art Unit | | | | | |
| | Donald L. Champagne | 2121 | | | | | |
| The MAILING DATE of this communication appeared for Reply | opears on the cover sheet with | the correspondence address | | | | | |
| A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REP THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION - Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1 after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. - If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a re - If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory perior - Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statu Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mail earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). | 136(a). In no event, however, may a reply ply within the statutory minimum of thirty (3 d will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTH. te, cause the application to become ABAN | y be timely filed 50) days will be considered timely. S from the mailing date of this communication. DONED (35 U.S.C. 8 133). | | | | | |
| Status | | | | | | | |
| 1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 24 | August 2004. | | | | | | |
| Pa)⊠ This action is FINAL . 2b)□ This action is non-final. | | | | | | | |
| 3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is | | | | | | | |
| closed in accordance with the practice under | | | | | | | |
| Disposition of Claims | | | | | | | |
| 4)⊠ Claim(s) <u>1-27</u> is/are pending in the applicatio | n. | | | | | | |
| 4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdrawn from consideration. | | | | | | | |
| 5) Claim(s) is/are allowed. | | | | | | | |
| 6)⊠ Claim(s) <u>1-5,7-11 and 13-27</u> is/are rejected. | | | | | | | |
| 7)⊠ Claim(s) <u>6 and 12</u> is/are objected to. | | | | | | | |
| 8) Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/ | or election requirement. | | | | | | |
| Application Papers | · | | | | | | |
| 9)☐ The specification is objected to by the Examin | er | | | | | | |
| 10)⊠ The drawing(s) filed on <u>06 February 2001</u> is/a | | ected to by the Evaminer | | | | | |
| Applicant may not request that any objection to the | | | | | | | |
| Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the corre | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | | |
| 11)☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the E | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 | | | | | | | |
| 12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreig | n priority under 35 U.S.C. § 1 | 19(a)-(d) or (f). | | | | | |
| a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of: | | | | | | | |
| 1. Certified copies of the priority documer | | | | | | | |
| 2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No | | | | | | | |
| 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage | | | | | | | |
| application from the International Burea | ` ` '// | | | | | | |
| * See the attached detailed Office action for a lis | t of the certified copies not red | ceived. | | | | | |
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| Attachment(s) | | | | | | | |
| 1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892) 2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) | 4) Linterview Sum | mary (PTO-413) lail Date | | | | | |
| 3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08 | 5) Notice of Infor | mal Patent Application (PTO-152) | | | | | |
| Paper No(s)/Mail Date | 6) Other: | , | | | | | |
| U.S. Patent and Trademark Office PTOL-326 (Rev. 1-04) Office A | Action Summary | Part of Paper No./Mail Date 20041211 | | | | | |

DETAILED ACTION

Response to Arguments

 Applicant's arguments filed with an amendment on 24 August 2004 have been fully considered but they are not wholly persuasive. The arguments are addressed at para. 4, 11 and 14-15 below. Allowable subject matter is indicated (para. 18-19 below).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101

2. 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

- 3. <u>Claims 7-18</u> are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The claimed invention is not within the technological arts i.e., no computer implementation or any other technology is employed.
- 4. The recitation "A computer system" in claims 7 and 14 has not been given patentable weight because the recitation occurs in the preamble. A preamble is generally not accorded any patentable weight where it merely recites the purpose of a process or the intended use of a structure, and where the body of the claim does not depend on the preamble for completeness but, instead, the process steps or structural limitations are able to stand alone. See *In re Hirao*, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976) and *Kropa v. Robie*, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 USPQ 478, 481 (CCPA 1951). The claim 1 amendment (instructions executable by the computer) succeeded in overcoming this rejection.
- 5. As an initial matter, the United States Constitution under Art. I, §8, cl. 8 gave Congress the power to "[p]romote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries". In carrying out this power, Congress authorized under 35 U.S.C. §101 a grant of a patent to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition or matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." Therefore, a fundamental premise is that a patent is a statutorily created vehicle for Congress to confer an exclusive right to the inventors for "inventions" that promote the progress of "science and the useful arts". The phrase "technological arts" has been created and used by the courts to

offer another view of the term "useful arts". See *In re Musgrave*, 167 USPQ (BNA) 280 (CCPA 1970). Hence, the first test of whether an invention is eligible for a patent is to determine if the invention is within the "technological arts".

- 6. Further, despite the express language of §101, several judicially created exceptions have been established to exclude certain subject matter as being patentable subject matter covered by §101. These exceptions include "laws of nature", "natural phenomena", and "abstract ideas". See *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450, U.S. 175, 185, 209 USPQ (BNA) 1, 7 (1981). However, courts have found that even if an invention incorporates abstract ideas, such as mathematical algorithms, the invention may nevertheless be statutory subject matter if the invention as a whole produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result." See *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.* 149 F.3d 1368, 1973, 47 USPQ2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
- 7. This "two prong" test was evident when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) decided an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See *In re Toma*, 197 USPQ (BNA) 852 (CCPA 1978). In *Toma*, the court held that the recited mathematical algorithm did not render the claim as a whole non-statutory using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test as applied to *Gottschalk v. Benson*, 409 U.S. 63, 175 USPQ (BNA) 673 (1972). Additionally, the court decided separately on the issue of the "technological arts". The court developed a "technological arts" analysis:

The "technological" or "useful" arts inquiry must focus on whether the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the product of the claimed subject matter...is statutory, not on whether the prior art which the claimed subject matter purports to replace...is statutory, and not on whether the claimed subject matter is presently perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g., whether it "enhances" the operation of a machine. *In re Toma* at 857.

In *Toma*, the claimed invention was a computer program for translating a source human language (e.g., Russian) into a target human language (e.g., English). The court found that the claimed computer implemented process was within the "technological art" because the claimed invention was an operation being performed by a computer within a computer.

8. The decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. never addressed this prong of the test. In State Street Bank & Trust Co., the court found that the "mathematical exception" using the Freeman-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, application to determining the presence of statutory subject matter but rather, statutory subject matter should be based on whether the operation produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result". See State Street Bank & Trust Co. at 1374. Furthermore, the court found that there was no "business method exception" since the court decisions that purported to create such exceptions were based on novelty or lack of enablement issues and not on statutory grounds. Therefore, the court held that "[w]hether the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to be judged under §101, but rather under §§102, 103 and 112." See State Street Bank & Trust Co. at 1377. Both of these analysis goes towards whether the claimed invention is non-statutory because of the presence of an abstract idea. Indeed, State Street abolished the Freeman-Walter-Abele test used in Toma. However, State Street never addressed the second part of the analysis, i.e., the "technological arts" test established in Toma because the invention in State Street (i.e., a computerized system for determining the year-end income, expense, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio) was already determined to be within the technological arts under the Toma test. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) have recently acknowledged this dichotomy in affirming a §101 rejection finding the claimed invention to be non-statutory. See Ex parte Bowman, 61 USPQ2d (BNA) 1669 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 2001).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

9. The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter that the applicant regards as his invention.

10. Claims 26 and 27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. The term "demand curve" in claims 26 and 27 is used by the claim to mean "a plot of inventory of ad impressions versus date" (Fig. 6, referred to at spec. p. 8 line 18), while the accepted meaning is "a plot of price versus quantity", e.g., Fig. 6.6 on p. 134 of Wilson. Also see the beginning of *The Demand Function* on p. 49 of Wilson. The claims are also indefinite because it is not clear what they have to do with "demand curves"

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as illustrated by Fig. 6. That is, a method for producing x should result in x. It is not clear how claims 26 and 27 result in the Fig. 6 curves.

11. Applicant argues (p. 11-12 of 17) that the rejection statement, "The term 'demand curve' in claims 26 and 27 is used by the claim to mean 'a plot of day of delivery versus days before delivery'", is a mistaken reading of claims 26 and 27. That criticism is correct. However, the rejection has been maintained with reference to the spec. p. 8 line 18, which calls Fig. 6 a family of demand curves.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 and 35 USC § 103

12. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -

- (e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.
- 13. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:
 - (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
- 14. Claims 1-5, 7-11 and 13-25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(e) as being anticipated by Miller.
- 15. Miller teaches (independent claims 1, 7,14, 19 and 24) a system and method for managing allocation levels of advertising (impression) inventory, the system comprising: a plurality of categories of ad impressions (ad spots, col. 3 line 2); a plurality of restrictions (guideline variables) designed to limit said allocation levels of said advertising (ad impression) inventory, wherein one or more of said plurality of restrictions are applied to one or more of

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said categories (sets of available spots) so as to limit the availability of said one or more of said categories of ad impressions (col. 3 lines 2-15).

- 16. Applicant argues (p. 13 of 17, end of first para.) that Miller neither teaches nor suggests anything about limiting the availability of advertising inventory. The rejection (para. 13 above) says that the *guideline variables* are the claimed restrictions designed to limit the availability of advertising (ad impression) inventory. Consider that there are 100 ad impressions potentially available for some certain ad spot, 50 advertising cars and 50 advertising perfume. If the ad buying system has programmed guideline variables to reject perfume ads, then it has limited the availability of advertising inventory to 50 ads.
- 17. Applicant argues in general (p. 12-14 of 17) that the reference and instant inventions have different purposes. Some of what applicant says is true, but irrelevant. All that matters is that the invention, as best as the examiner can determine, reads on the claims. Except for the one instance (para. 14 above), the examiner cannot find that applicant has distinctly and specifically pointed out the supposed errors in the examiner's action (37 CFR 1.111(b)).
- 18. Miller also teaches at the citations given above claims 3-5, 9-11, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23 and 25.
- 19. <u>Miller also teaches</u> claims 2, 13, 18, 22 (col. 3 lines 16-19); and claims 8 and 15 (col. 1 lines 33 and 39).

Allowable Subject Matter

- 20. <u>Claims 6 and 12</u> are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
- 21. <u>Claims 26 and 27</u> would be allowable if rewritten to overcome the rejection(s) under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, set forth in this Office action.
- 22. Allowance is further dependent on successful vetting by a "second pair of eyes". Examiner has performed every search deemed reasonable, but does not ask for review of allowable subject matter until applicant indicates willingness to put the application in condition for allowance.

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Conclusion

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- 23. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
- 24. Applicant's submission of an information disclosure statement under 37 CFR 1.97(c) with the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(p) on *** prompted the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 609(B)(2)(i). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).
- 25. A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
- 26. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Donald L Champagne whose telephone number is 571-272-6717. The examiner can normally be reached from 6:30 AM to 5 PM ET, Monday to Thursday. The examiner can also be contacted by e-mail at donald.champagne@uspto.gov, and informal fax communications (i.e., communications not to be made of record) may be sent directly to the examiner at 571-273-6717.
- 27. The examiner's supervisor, Eric Stamber, can be reached on 703-305-8469. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306. Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is 703-308-1113.
- 28. AFTER FINAL PRACTICE Consistent with MPEP § 706.07(f) and 713.09, prosecution generally ends with the final rejection. Examiner will grant an interview after final only when applicant presents compelling evidence that "disposal or clarification for appeal may be

accomplished with only nominal further consideration" (MPEP § 713.09). The burden is on applicant to demonstrate this requirement, preferably in no more than 25 words. Amendments are entered after final only when the amendments will clearly simplify issues, or put the case into condition for allowance, clearly and without additional search or more than nominal consideration.

- 29. Applicant may have after final arguments considered and amendments entered by filing an RCE.
- 30. ABANDONMENT If examiner cannot by telephone verify applicant's intent to continue prosecution, the application is subject to abandonment six months after mailing of the last Office action. The agent, attorney or applicant point of contact is responsible for assuring that the Office has their telephone number. Agents and attorneys may verify their registration information including telephone number at the Office's web site, www.uspto.gov. At the top of the home page, click on Site Index. Then click on Agent & Attorney Roster in the alphabetic list, and search for your registration by your name or number.

DONALD L. CHAMPAGNE

PRIMARY EXAMINER

11 December 2004

Donald L. Champagne Primary Examiner Art Unit 3622 (2121 Detail)